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Description
The Eurozone crisis has pushed reform of the European Union (EU) to the  forefront 
of political debate. How can a Union of 28 states with a population of over half a 
billion be reformed to weather future economic crises and  political challenges? 
Finding an answer to this question is extremely difficult not only  because current 
reform proposals are so varied, but even more so because we lack insights into the 
preferences for reform amongst national elites and  publics. Although EU support 
has interested scholars for over three decades now, we  virtually know nothing 
about public support for EU reform. Current research focuses almost exclusively 
on the causes of support for the current  project and fails to provide a sufficient 
basis for effective reform decisions. Surely, the  feasibility and sustainability of 
EU reform crucially hinges on the support amongst  national publics. eupinions 
examines public support for EU reform by developing a theoretical model and 
employing cutting-edge data collection techniques. Our findings will aid policy 
makers to craft EU reform proposals that can secure widespread public support.
Executive Summary
he results presented in this report suggest that people are somewhat 
conflicted when it comes to the EU. While a majority of citizens sup-
port their country’s membership of the Union and further political and 
economic integration, they are not satisfied with policy direction in 
the EU. Yet, the same respondents say that they espouse mostly positive views 
about the EU when talking to friends. Put simply, people support the idea of a 
united Europe, but are increasingly wary about its current direction. These pat-
terns are quite stable over the four different waves which spanned from Decem-
ber 2015 to August 2016.  
The figures show that support for EU membership remains very high in the EU as 
a whole. Across the time period support is above 65 per cent and in August 2016 
even well above 70 per cent. Interestingly, by August 2016 public support for EU 
membership is not the lowest in Great Britain, but in Italy. At the end of the time 
period of investigation, public support for membership is barely above 50 per 
cent mark in Italy. Public support for EU membership in Germany mimicked the 
levels in France, Great Britain and Italy in December 2015, but picked up and rose 
to just below 80 per cent in the post-Brexit period.  
Compared to people’s preferences for EU membership, support for further inte-
gration is somewhat lower. In fact, by the end of period of investigation, support 
for integration is about 50-50, a decrease from July 2015. 
Overall, support for the general policy direction in the EU is much lower than 
support for membership and further integration. Across the time period only a 
quarter of the population in the EU-28 thinks the EU is moving in the right direc-
tion. The same holds true for the national level however. People are not positive 
about the policy direction in the EU, nor about their nation’s policy direction.
Interestingly, we see a rise in the share of people who would talk positively about 
the EU to friends since the Brexit vote. By August 2016, a large majority says 
that they espouse mostly positive views about the EU when talking to friends. 
This suggests that the Brexit vote might have sparked off  more positive feelings 
about the EU as a whole.
T
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Introduction 
he Eurozone and refugee crises as well as the British decision to leave 
the Union have put the future of the European Union (EU) at the front 
of public debate. In his 2016 State of the Union address, Commission 
President Jean-Claude Juncker suggested that “[o]ur European Union 
is, at least in part, in an existential crisis.” 1 Questions are currently being raised 
about the reforms needed to regain public confidence in the European project. In 
the same speech, Commission president Juncker suggests that: 
“Europeans want concrete solutions to the very pertinent problem that our Union 
is facing. And they want more than promises, resolutions and summit conclusions. 
They have heard and seen these too often. Europeans want common decisions 
followed by swift and efficient implementation.” 
Yet, what do the citizens of Europe want from their European institutions? And 
how do they view the future of the European project? Answers to these questions 
are crucially important when possible reform scenarios are discussed and decid-
ed on. Moreover, given that much of our attention is currently spent on political 
changes and across the European continent and in the United States as well as 
on the contours of the Brexit negotiations, we must not lose sight of general 
trends in public opinion towards the EU. This report aims to present some insight 
into this.
The report presents data from the bi-annual eupinions surveys conducted under 
the supervision of Isabell Hoffmann and Catherine De Vries on behalf of the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung. Although each wave of the survey focuses on a specific 
topic, the core questionnaire includes a set of questions we ask in every wave. 
This report attempts to provide a short overview of some of the answers to these 
core questions. Specifically, here we focus on people’ responses to the following 
five questions:
•	 Imagine there is a referendum and you could decide whether your country stays as a 
member of the European Union. How would you vote?
 – I would vote for my country to leave the European Union 
 – I would vote for my country to remain the European Union 
1  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-16-3043_en.htm
T
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•	 If you had to choose, which of the following statements best describes your overall 
attitude towards European integration? 
 – We need more political and economic integration across Europe
 – Things should remain as they are today 
 – We need less political and economic integration across Europe 
•	 Think about policies of the European Union in general. Would you say that things are 
currently moving in the right direction?
 – Yes, things are moving in the right direction
 – No, things are moving in the wrong direction
•	 Think about policies in [Your Country] in general. Would you say that things are 
currently moving in the right direction?
 – Yes, things are moving in the right direction
 – No, things are moving in the wrong direction
•	 Imagine you talk with a friend or colleague about the European Union. Would your 
conversation be:
 – very positive
 – mostly positive,  
 – mostly negative
 – very negative,
We asked these questions to a representative sample of all citizens in the 28 EU 
member states as well as in the six member states with the largest populations, 
France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Poland and Spain. We fielded these ques-
tions in July and December 2015 as well as March and August 2016. We present 
average responses of all citizens in the EU-28 and six member states as well as 
for different age groups, gender and education categories. Our results are designed 
to provide an empirical basis for public debates about the future of the EU and 
will hopefully aid policy makers to craft EU reform proposals that can secure 
widespread public support. 
The results presented in this report suggest that people are somewhat conflicted 
when it comes to the EU. While a majority of citizens support their country’s 
membership of the Union and further political and economic integration, they 
are not satisfied with policy direction in the EU. Yet, the same respondents say 
that they espouse mostly positive views about the EU when talking to friends. 
Put simply, people support the idea of a united Europe, but are increasingly wary 
about its current direction. These patterns are quite stable over the four different 
waves. 
We also report interesting regional and socio-demographic differences. When it 
comes to regional differences, we find interesting differences across countries. 
Italians together with the British are most sceptical of their country’s member-
ship in the EU. They also view the overall policy direction in the EU as very 
negative. Unlike British respondents, however, the majority of Italians wish to 
see more rather than less political and economic integration in the future. 
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Spaniards and Poles are much more positive about their country’s membership 
in the EU. French and German respondents are somewhat in the middle catego-
ry. While the overall support for further integration has clearly waned among 
French respondents between July 2015 and August 2016, it has stayed quite stable 
among German respondents. 
When socio-demographic differences are concerned, we find only two consistent 
differences. The data shows that highly educated respondents and those living 
in cities hold much more positive views about Europe than low educated citizens 
and those living in rural areas. These differences are quite stable over time. We 
define these groups based on having a university education or not, and the current 
residency (urban or rural area). Gender differences are quite small. When it comes 
to age cohorts we find mixed results. While the 18 to 25 years old are most posi-
tive about their country’s membership in the EU and the overall policy direction 
in the EU, preferences about more political and economic integration show little 
difference based on age. Also, the 18 and 25 year olds as well as the 55 to 65 years 
old would talk most positively about the EU to friends. 
We proceed as follows. First, we discuss the distribution of responses to the five 
questions listed above, and highlight differences between countries and times. 
Second, we discuss differences between socio-demographic groups. The third 
part concludes and provides some practical recommendations. 
7
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In Focus
What is the Mood on 
Europe in Europe? 
In a first step, we examine one’s support for their country’s member-
ship of the Union in the EU as a whole as well as in six specific member 
states that have the largest populations. Figure 1 displays the share of 
people who state that they would vote for their country to remain a 
member of the EU if a referendum were held today in the EU-28 across the time 
period of investigation, July 2015 until August 2016. The Figure shows that support 
for EU membership remains very high in the EU as a whole. Across the time 
period support is above 65 per cent and in August 2016 even well above 70 per 
cent. Although we witnessed a slight drop in support in March 2016, after the 
Brexit vote support rose again. 
EU 28
FIGURE 1  Support for Country’s EU Membership, EU-28
2016
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Figure 2 displays the shares of those who state that they would vote for their 
country to remain in the EU across the same time period. While support is 
extremely high across the entire time period, 80 per cent or higher in Poland and 
Spain, it is much lower in Great Britain, France and Italy. Interestingly, by August 
2016 public support for EU membership is not the lowest in Great Britain, but in 
Italy. At the end of the time period of investigation, public support for member-
ship is barely above 50 per cent mark in Italy. Public support for EU membership 
in Germany mimicked the levels in France, Great Britain and Italy in December 
2015, but picked up and rose to just below 80 per cent in the post-Brexit period. 
In a next step, we explore people’s preferences for further political and econom-
ic integration. Figure 3 shows the share of people who wish to see more political 
and economic integration in Europe in years to come. Compared to people’s 
preferences for EU membership, support for further integration is somewhat 
lower. In fact, by the end of period of investigation support for integration is 
about 50-50, and has decreased from July 2015. 
FIGURE 2  Support for Country’s EU Membership, Six Countries
2016
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Figure 4 displays the share of people who wish to see further political and eco-
nomic integration in the six member states with the largest population. Not 
surprisingly perhaps, support for more integration is the lowest among British 
respondents. Less than 40 per cent of British respondents wish to see more 
integration. While support for EU membership was shown to be the lowest in 
Italy, at the same time Figure 4 suggests that support for further integration is 
the highest among Italian respondents. It seems that unlike British respondents 
who are sceptical about both membership and further integration, Italians are 
sceptical of membership in part because they wish to see more integration in the 
future. Public opinion in Spain, a country that like Italy was strongly hit by the 
Eurozone crisis, also strongly favours more political and economic integration in 
the future. Across the time period of investigation support for integration hovers 
around the 70 per cent mark. 
EU 28
FIGURE 3  Preference for More Political and Economic Integration in Europe, EU-28
2016
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FIGURE 4  Preference for More Political and Economic Integration in Europe, Six Countries
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The level of public support for integration in Germany, Poland and France lies 
between the most negative pole of Great Britain and the most positive pole of 
Italy and Spain. While support in Germany and Poland moves up and down, around 
the 50 per cent mark, support for more political and economic integration in 
France clearly declines across the time period of investigation. In August 2016, 
roughly 40 per cent of French respondents wish to see more integration.
After having established trends in support for EU membership and further inte-
gration, we explore people’s evaluations of the policy direction in the EU. Figure 
5 below displays the trends in the share of people agreeing with the statement 
that the EU is moving in the right direction in the EU-28. Overall, support for the 
general policy direction in the EU is much lower than support for membership 
and further integration. On average across the time period only a quarter of the 
population in the EU-28 thinks the EU is moving in the right direction.  
Figure 6 shows the shares of respondents in the six largest EU member states 
who think that the EU is moving in the right direction. Approval of the policy 
direction in the EU is quite low. Like in the case of EU membership, Italian 
respondents are the most sceptical, less than a quarter agrees with the overall 
policy direction in the EU. Interestingly, support for the overall policy direction 
in the EU is comparatively the highest in Great Britain, followed by Poland and 
Spain. Except for the data from Great Britain, Italy and Poland that shows quite 
some fluctuations, the trends over time are fairly stable.  
EU 28
FIGURE 5  Agreement with Statement EU is Moving in Right Direction, EU-28
2016
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In order to put these results in some more context, we now turn our attention to 
the share of respondents who evaluate the policy direction in their country 
positively. We asked the same question we just reviewed, but this time asked 
about the policy direction at the national level. Figure 7 shows the shares of 
respondents in the EU-28 who view that their country is moving in the right 
direction. Like in the case of people’s views of the policy direction in the EU, only 
a third of people view the national policy direction positively. These trends 
suggest that although people are not positive about the policy direction in the 
EU, they are also not positive about the direction at the national level.
FIGURE 6  Agreement with Statement EU is Moving in Right Direction, Six Countries
2016
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FIGURE 7  Agreement with Statement Own Country is Moving in Right Direction, EU-28
2016
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Figure 8 shows the trends within the six largest member states.  While overall 
people evaluate the national policy direction quite sceptically, by August 2016 
two groups of countries seem to have emerged. While respondents in France, 
Italy and Spain view the policy direction in their country very negatively (only 
about 15 per cent think that things are moving in the right direction), respondents 
in Germany, Great Britain and Poland are slightly less negative. That said, even 
though only a third (or even less) of citizens support the policy direction in these 
countries. Except for Great Britain, the average support for the national policy 
direction has declined in the largest EU member states. 
The last question we review to inspect the mood of Europeans about Europe asks 
respondents about how they would talk about the EU to friends. Figure 9 shows 
the share of respondents who say that they would talk mostly or very positive 
about the EU. Interestingly, we see a rise in the share of people who would talk 
positively about the EU to friends since the Brexit vote. By August 2016, a large 
majority says that they espouse mostly positive views about the EU when talking 
to friends. This suggests that the Brexit vote might have sparked off  more 
positive feelings about the EU as a whole. 
FIGURE 8  Agreement with Statement Own Country is Moving in Right Direction, Six Countries
2016
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Figure 10 shows the responses to the same questions in the six largest EU member 
states. In Poland, the share of those talking positively about the EU is clearly the 
largest. Moreover, the share of Polish respondents that would talk positively 
increases over the time period of investigation. Italian and French public opinion 
is least positive when it comes to talking about the EU. That said, even among these 
populations there was a more positive shift across time. Interestingly, even public 
opinion in Great Britain became more positive over time. 
EU 28
FIGURE 9  Talk Positively About EU to Friends, EU-28
2016
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FIGURE 10  Talk Positively About EU to Friends, Six Countries
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Differences in Mood across Age Groups, Genders, Education 
Levels and City versus Rural Location
Figure 11 shows the differences in support for EU membership across age groups. 
The support for EU membership across age groups is remarkably stable over the 
time period of investigation. What becomes very clear from Figure 11 is that the 
youngest age cohort, those between 18 and 25 year old, is most positive about the 
their country’s membership in the EU.
Figure 12 shows EU membership support for male and female respondents. We 
see very little change over time and hardly any difference between men and 
women when it comes to their support for membership.
FIGURE 11  Support for Country’s EU Membership Across Age Groups, EU-28
2016
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FIGURE 12  Support for Country’s EU Membership Across Genders, EU-28
2016
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Figure 13 shows the difference between high and low educated citizens when it 
comes to their EU membership support. High educated citizens are defined as those 
with university education, and low educated are those without. While support for 
EU membership is very pronounced among both the high and low educated citizens, 
it is about ten percentage point higher among the university educated. 
Figure 14 shows the difference between respondents who reside in urban or rural 
areas. Although the differences between city and rural residents are less pronounced 
than those between the high and low educated, we persistently find that city 
residents display higher support for their country to remain a member of the EU 
across the time period.
High Education
Low Education
FIGURE 13  Support for Country’s EU Membership Across Educational Groups, EU-28
2016
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FIGURE 14  Support for Country’s EU Membership Across City Versus Rural Residents, EU-28
2016
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How about people’s support for further political and economic integration in 
Europe? While the results presented in Figure 11 show that the youngest age 
cohort, the 18 to 25 year olds, are most supportive of their country’s membership 
in the EU, Figure 15 shows that in terms of support for more political and eco-
nomic integration in Europe, the opinions between cohorts are very small. While 
support for more integration in July 2015 hovers somewhat between 50 and 60 
per cent for all age groups, with the 36 to 55 years old being the most supportive, 
by August 2016 support has somewhat fallen to the 50 per cent mark. Figure 16 
shows the same pattern for female and male respondents. Also, the Figure shows 
that both genders hold virtually identical views about more political and eco-
nomic integration in Europe. 
FIGURE 15  Preference for More Political and Economic Integration in Europe 
Across Age Groups, EU-28
2016
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FIGURE 16  Preference for More Political and Economic Integration in Europe Across Genders, EU-28
2016
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Turning our attention to differences in support for integration across education-
al groups in Figure 17, we see that like in the case of support for EU membership 
highly educated citizens holding a university degree are more supportive of further 
integrative steps. That said, over the time period of investigation we see a sub-
stantial drop in support for integration among both high and low educated groups. 
When it comes to support for more political and economic integration in Europe, 
we find that city dwellers are more positive on average than rural residents. 
Figure 18 shows an overall decline for support for more integration across both 
groups, but on average the majority of city residents in August 2016 prefer more 
political and economic integration, while less than 50 per cent of rural residents 
do.
High Education
Low Education
FIGURE 17  Preference for More Political and Economic Integration in Europe 
Across Educational Groups, EU-28
2016
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FIGURE 18  Preference for More Political and Economic Integration in Europe 
Across City Versus Rural Residents, EU-28
2016
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Figure 19 shows the trends in people’s agreement with the overall policy direction 
in the EU by age cohort. Like we established before, support for the policy direc-
tion the EU is taking is overall much lower compared to EU membership or 
integration support. Like was the case for EU membership support, approval of 
the policy direction in the EU is the highest among the youngest age cohort, 18 
to 25 year olds, but the trend is downward across the time period of investigation. 
Interestingly, the only age group that by August 2016 is slightly more positive of 
the overall policy direction in the EU is the oldest one, the 56 to 65 years old. 
We now turn to differences between men and women in Figure 20. Overall, 
within the period between July 2015 and August 2016 male respondents are more 
positive of the overall policy direction in the EU compared to women. That said, 
by August 2016 the difference between men and women has become almost 
negligible. Only a quarter of male and female respondents in the EU-28 think 
that the EU is moving in the right direction. 
FIGURE 19  Agreement with Statement EU is Moving in Right Direction Across Age Groups, EU-28
2016
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FIGURE 20  Agreement with Statement EU is Moving in Right Direction Across Genders, EU-28
2016
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Figure 21 shows the difference between those who have university degrees versus 
those who do not in their evaluations of the policy direction the EU is taking. 
When it comes to educational groups we seem to consistently find that highly 
educated respondents are more positive about the EU compared to their lower 
educated counterparts. This is true for support for EU membership, EU integra-
tion and the policy direction of the EU. 
We also find consistent differences between city and rural residents. Like in the 
case of membership support and preferences for more integration, city residents 
are more positive about the overall policy direction taken by the EU compared to 
rural residents, see Figure 22. That said, support for the policy direction taken by 
the EU is low on average. Only a third of city residents are positive about the 
overall policy direction in the EU, while a quarter of rural residents are. 
High Education
Low Education
FIGURE 21  Agreement with Statement EU is Moving in Right Direction 
Across Educational Groups, EU-28
2016
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FIGURE 22  Agreement with Statement EU is Moving in Right Direction 
Across City Versus Rural Residents, EU-28
2016
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Now we examine people’s responses to a similar question about the policy 
direction, but in reference to the national level. Figure 23 above displays the 
trends in positive evaluations of the national policy direction across the different 
age groups. Interestingly, while across the time period the 18 to 25 year olds were 
most positive about the EU policy direction, in 2015 the oldest age cohort is. 
Between July 2015 and August 2016, the share of 56 to 65 holding positive evalu-
ations of the overall policy direction at the national level declines to 10 per cent 
overall. By August 2016, the youngest age cohort is most positive. Overall, the 
share of people holding positive evaluations of the national policy direction drops 
below one-third in all age groups by the end of the time period. 
Figure 24 explores gender differences and shows that across the time period of 
investigation male respondents hold more positive evaluations about the nation-
al policy direction than female respondents. This gender difference is roughly 
stable at 10 er cent over the time period. Like in the case of evaluations about the 
EU policy direction, males on average hold more positive views. 
FIGURE 23  Agreement with Statement Own Country is Moving in Right Direction 
Across Age Groups, EU-28
2016
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FIGURE 24  Agreement with Statement Own Country is Moving in Right Direction 
Across Genders, EU-28
2016
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Figure 25 supports the general pattern we have found in the data for low and high 
educated respondents. Low educated respondents are not only more wary of EU 
politics, they are also more sceptical of national politics. Less than a quarter of 
low educated respondents see the policy direction of their country through 
positive eyes.  
Figure 26 displays the same information, but now split by city versus rural resi-
dents. The trends show that citiy residence are equally negative about thet 
national policy direction compared to rural residents. Interestingly, this pattern 
is different than what we found for the EU policy direction. Overall, only a quar-
ter of city and of rural residents approve of the overall policy direction taken at 
the national level, compared to even less than a quarter of rural residents. 
High Education
Low Education
FIGURE 25  Agreement with Statement Own Country is Moving in Right Direction 
Across Educational Groups, EU-28
2016
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FIGURE 26  Agreement with Statement Own Country is Moving in Right Direction 
Across City and Rural Residents, EU-28
2016
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We end our inspection of differences in EU attitudes between socio-demograph-
ic groups by exploring the extent to which people state that they would talk 
positively about the EU to friends. Figure 27 displays differences based on age 
groups, and shows that overall we observe an upward trend in the share of 
respondents stating that they would talk positively about the EU. This upward 
trend seems most pronounced in the post-Brexit time frame. By August 2016, a 
clear majority across the age groups would talk positively about the EU. Inter-
estingly, both the youngest and oldest age groups are most positive with over 70 
per cent stating that they would talk positively about the EU. 
Figure 28 shows differences based on gender, and suggests that these are very 
small. In fact in March and August 2016, women and men would be equally 
likely to talk positively about the EU to friends, roughly 65 per cent would. 
FIGURE 27   Talk Positively About EU to Friends Across Age Groups, EU-28
2016
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FIGURE 28  Talk Positively About EU to Friends Across Age Groups, EU-28
2016
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Figure 29 displays differences across educational groups and again supports the 
idea that the highly educated citizens consistently are more positive about the 
EU. While both the shares of high and low educated citizens that would talk 
positively about the EU increased post-Brexit, the differences based on education 
are quite stable across the time period. By August 2016, over 70 per cent of the 
highly educated would talk positively about the EU, just over 60 per cent of the 
low educated would.  
Finally, Figure 30 shows the share of city versus rural residents that would talk 
positively about the EU to friends. Although the differences are smaller than 
those reported for education, we again find that city residents are slightly more 
positive about the EU than rural residents. Moreover, we again find a slight 
increase in the post-Brexit period where 67 per cent of city dwellers would talk 
positively about the EU to friends, while 63 per cent of rural residents would. 
High Education
Low Education
FIGURE 29  Talk Positively About EU to Friends Across Educational Groups, EU-28
2016
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FIGURE 30  Talk Positively About EU to Friends Across City and Rural Residents, EU-28
2016
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uropeans are somewhat conflicted when it comes to the EU. While a 
majority of citizens support their country’s membership of the Union 
and further political and economic integration, they are not satisfied 
with policy direction in the EU. Yet, the same respondents say that 
they espouse mostly positive views about the EU when talking to friends. In oth-
er words, people support the idea of a united Europe, but are increasingly wary 
about its current state of affairs. These patterns are quite stable since our first 
survey in summer 2015. When it comes to principle and potential, people are 
largely positive. When it comes to the state of affairs and short-term projection, 
negativity sweeps in.
What has shifted within this pattern is how people view their country’s 
membership, how they talk about the EU and what they think the Union’s way 
forward should be. In the beginning of our investigation, a clear majority of Eu-
ropeans were in favour of their country’s membership. At the same time, they 
told us, that in their opinion, the EU needs more political and economic integra-
tion. Fewer people however told us that if the EU ever came up in a conversation 
with friends, they would expect it to be positive. In fact, Europeans were split 
over this question. 50 per cent told us they would expect such a conversation to 
be rather positive, 50 per cent told us they believe it is rather negative. 
Today, Europeans are even more supportive of their country’s membership 
and they believe that more of their friends and neighbours share this view 
through positive remarks about the EU in a conversation. However, fewer of 
them believe that further political and economic integration would be needed. 
What happened for this shift to occur? When it comes to membership and 
talk among friends, we do observe a Brexit effect. In the face of a break-up, even 
more Europeans than before were ready to express their preference for member-
ship, be it in a referendum, be it in a private conversation. Why then this decline 
of support for further integration? Our best assumption is that the focus of the 
political debate has shifted since the second half of 2015. Until July 2015 all eyes 
were on the Euro crisis and Greece. However controversial the measures taken to 
fix the Greek economical system, most experts and pundits agreed on the fact 
that the Eurozone needed fixing too. This meant further integration when it 
comes to the Economic and Monetary Union. The alternative was the disintegra-
tion of the Eurozone which was highly unpopular even in countries like Greece. 
The status quo was proven to be flawed, and as a consequence, when inquired by 
us, more integration seemed to be the right choice. 
Today however, the focus of the public debate has shifted away from the mis-
constructions of the Eurozone and its side effects. Today, we are concerned about 
crisis in our neighbourhood, about the management of the refugee crisis, about 
the British decision to leave the EU, about a new administration in Washington, 
Concluding Remarks 
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about the rise of populism in several European member states and their effect on 
the world we live in. 
When observing public opinion through surveys, one cannot help but recog-
nising the impact of the political and public debate on it. People still tend to rate 
highly what’s on the front page of newspapers and in the evening news. In the 
actual political environment, the value of European cooperation is not contested. 
Quite the contrary. The source of trouble and worry seems to lay elsewhere. As 
the focus changed, the question of further or less integration lost importance in 
the public debate. Hence the awareness dropped. Hence the numbers dropped.  
It is worth noticing that however deep the crisis and however lively the con-
troversy about the flaws of the construction of the European political system, the 
majority of Europeans never gave up on European integration. Their perception 
of the European Union might have become more complex with more issues to 
worry about and more questions to ask but this never translated into a general 
rejection of the European Union. In this regard, the numbers are in sharp con-
trast to the general assumption about the state of public support. Today’s gener-
al assumption is much bleaker than what Europeans tell us.  As we celebrate the 
60 year anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, we should not only acknowledge the 
challenges ahead of us but also recognize how far we have come. For most Euro-
peans, the European Union is a political reality they would like to see improved 
but certainly not to vanish.
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Method 
his report presents an overview of serval studies conducted by Da-
lia Research between August 2015 and August 2016 on public opinion 
across 28 EU Member States. The samples of n>10.000 were drawn 
across all 28 EU Member States, taking into account current popula-
tion distributions with regard to age (14–65 years), gender and region/country. 
In order to obtain census representative results, the data were weighted based 
upon the most recent Eurostat statistics. The target weighting variables were 
age, gender, level of education (as defined by ISCED (2011) levels 0–2, 3–4, and 
5–8), and degree of urbanization (rural and urban). An iterative algorithm was 
used to identify the optimal combination of weighting variables based on the 
sample composition within each country. An estimation of the overall design ef-
fect based on the distribution of weights was calculated at 1.54 at the global level. 
Calculated for random samples of this size and considering the design-effect, 
the margin of error would be +/-1.1 per cent at a confidence level of 95 per cent.
T
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Data Appendix 
Imagine there is a referendum and you could decide whether your country stays as a member of 
the European Union. How would you vote?
I would vote for my country to remain the European Union :
France Germany Great Britain Italy Poland Spain EU-28
July 2015 71% 74% 58% 62% 81% 78% 71%
Dec 2015 67% 68% 66% 64% 80% 74% 69%
March 2016 59% 70% 57% 54% 77% 79% 65
August 2016 63% 77% 65% 56% 82% 79% 70%
Male Female City Rural Low Educated High Educated
July 2015 71% 72% 73% 67%
Dec 2015 69% 70% 61% 58% 76% 65%
March 2016 64% 66% 66% 63% 73% 62%
August 2016 69% 71% 71% 68% 77% 67%
18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65
July 2015 76% 71% 71% 70% 68%
Dec 2015 76% 67% 68% 65% 67%
March 2016 74% 63% 64% 61% 65%
August 2016 79% 70% 66% 67% 71%
If you had to choose, which of the following statements best describes your overall attitude 
towards European integration? 
We need more political and economic integration across Europe :
France Germany Great Britain Italy Poland Spain EU-28
July 2015 54% 54% 38% 76% 54% 76% 58%
Dec 2015 52% 48% 65% 54% 76% 59% 59%
March 2016 48% 60% 32% 69% 50% 75% 55%
August 2016 41% 52% 37% 71% 46% 67% 51%
Male Female City Rural Low Educated High Educated
July 2015 57% 58% 59% 53%
Dec 2015 58% 60% 59% 58% 57% 64%
March 2016 56% 55% 57% 51% 54% 59%
August 2016 52% 51% 53% 46% 50% 55%
18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65
July 2015 53% 57% 60% 60% 53%
Dec 2015 57% 57% 63% 61% 58%
March 2016 58% 54% 55% 54% 55%
August 2016 51% 51% 52% 50% 52%
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 Think about policies of the European Union in general. Would you say that things are currently 
moving in the right direction?
Yes, things are moving in the right direction :
France Germany Great Britain Italy Poland Spain EU-28
July 2015 21% 26% 33% 10% 45% 25% 28%
Dec 2015 27% 28% 19% 24% 23% 23% 25%
March 2016 19% 21% 36% 14% 30% 21% 25%
August 2016 20% 23% 34% 17% 31% 24% 25%
Male Female City Rural Low Educated High Educated
July 2015 30% 26% 29% 26%
Dec 2015 28% 23% 26% 24% 23% 30%
March 2016 27% 23% 25% 23% 23% 30%
August 2016 26% 25% 26% 23% 24% 28%
18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65
July 2015 33% 28% 27% 26% 27%
Dec 2015 29% 25% 23% 25% 25%
March 2016 30% 23% 24% 23% 23%
August 2016 28% 27% 24% 23% 27%
Think about policies in your Country in general. Would you say that things are currently moving in 
the right direction?
Yes, things are moving in the right direction :
France Germany Great Britain Italy Poland Spain EU-28
July 2015 19% 35% 44% 12% 40% 28% 31%
Dec 2015 24% 34% 18% 30% 31% 27% 27%
March 2016 14% 24% 36% 12% 29% 16% 24%
August 2016 15% 27% 40% 14% 34% 16% 25%
Male Female City Rural Low Educated High Educated
July 2015 35% 28% 32% 31%
Dec 2015 31% 23% 27% 27% 25% 30%
March 2016 27% 21% 24% 24% 22% 29%
August 2016 28% 23% 26% 25% 24% 29%
18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65
July 2015 34% 29% 30% 31% 35%
Dec 2015 28% 25% 25% 28% 34%
March 2016 28% 21% 24% 22% 26%
August 2016 30% 27% 23% 24% 25%
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 Imagine you talk with a friend or colleague about the European Union.  
Would your conversation be:
very or mostly positive :
France Germany Great Britain Italy Poland Spain EU-28
July 2015 46% 54% 44% 37% 71% 55% 52%
Dec 2015 47% 52% 42% 49% 61% 52% 51%
March 2016 36% 48% 51% 29% 66% 48% 47%
August 2016 61% 67% 71% 49% 79% 71% 66%
Male Female City Rural Low Educated High Educated
July 2015 54% 51% 54% 47%
Dec 2015 53% 49% 51% 49% 47% 56%
March 2016 48% 46% 47% 45% 45% 52%
August 2016 65% 66% 67% 63% 63% 72%
18-25 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-65
July 2015 56% 51% 51% 52% 49%
Dec 2015 54% 47% 49% 52% 54%
March 2016 51% 42% 46% 45% 54%
August 2016 72% 65% 64% 62% 70%
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